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Maximal Preference Utilitarianism as an Educational Aspiration 
 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to square libertarian principles with the reality of formal education 
by asking how far we should and can allow people to do as they wish in educational 
settings. The major focus is on children in schools, as the concept ‘childhood’ ipso facto 
implies restrictions on doing as one wishes, and schools as institutions entail inevitable 
constraints. Children by definition (however contested) tend to enjoy stronger protection 
rights but weaker liberty rights than adults
 
(XXX, 2011; Feinberg, 1980). A local 
preferential calculus (after Bentham’s felicific calculus) is developed as a guide for 
teachers, suggesting wishes should be granted where feasible and at least welfare 
neutral. In the case of teachers, employers set the parameters for the feasibility criterion 
but should also ensure at least welfare-neutrality, while students in adult and higher 
education should be responsible for the feasibility and welfare outcomes of their own 
choices.  
Keywords: utilitarianism, education, preference, philosophy 
Introduction 
The argument has four stages. The first defines and justifies maximal (as opposed to 
maximum) preference (as opposed to pleasure) utilitarianism, rejects flat universal 
utilitarian conceptions, and considers the problematic position of the child with respect 
to preference granting. The second considers the somewhat patchy treatment of 
utilitarianism in the philosophy of education literature. The third develops a specific 
local preferential calculus for school teachers, and the fourth considers the application 
of this to educational actors other than schoolchildren, specifically adult students and 
teachers. 
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Maximal Preference Utilitarianism 
 
Given that a school in which everyone did as they wished all the time would likely be 
chaotic, the first challenge is to justify the premise that preference utilitarianism has any 
value as an educational ideal. One important aspect of this relates to children and the 
degree to which they can and should be trusted to exercise preferences. This will be 
discussed below, but the argument as a whole is likely to attract sympathy only from 
those who are inclined to the view that important learning comes from exercising and 
taking the consequences of risks that one has taken on for oneself. Those who consider 
that children should have no significant rights to choose reject a basic premise 
underpinning this paper.  
 
In relation to the justification of preference utilitarianism in education, it is important to 
note two implicit caveats in the title of the paper, and to make some other preliminary 
remarks by means of clarification of working concepts. The first concerns the term 
‘maximal’ as opposed to ‘maximum’. ‘Maximal’ implies a feasibility criterion not 
implied in ‘maximum’. The espoused aim here, therefore, is not to allow all sorts of 
preference fulfilment all of the time and immediately, but rather to aim for schools and 
other educational institutions to be places where actors (teachers as well as students) can 
exercise their preferences as far as possible within institutional constraints, given that 
such constraints in part exist in order to protect (particularly in the case of children), 
without undue detriment to the preferences of others. 
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The second caveat concerns the choice of ‘preference’. The argument takes preference 
utility as a regulative ideal, along the lines of beauty or perfection: something constantly 
to be aimed for with the recognition that it can never be fully achieved. The question 
remains as to why such an ideal should be embraced even as an aspiration, however. 
Here there are what might crudely be termed more negative and positive justifications, 
broadly along the lines of Berlin’s conceptions of negative and positive liberty: freedom 
from and freedom to (Berlin, 1958). The more negative argument might be taken from 
Hobbes, insofar as freedom is considered not as constructed through rights-granting so 
much as a natural condition part of which is necessarily conceded for mutual security
 
(Hobbes, 2014). The more negative justification might also draw on Lyotard’s argument 
that the postmodern condition is one of values fragmentation and ‘incredulity towards 
metanarratives’ (Lyotard, 1986: xvi). On this postmodern account, there are no better or 
more enduring grounds for education than the feasible granting of preferences, as no 
other candidate value (one might cite social justice, economic growth, or national 
identity) can command sufficient rational consensus. In both these cases, there are no 
stronger grounds for acting than in relation to preference, construed either as the 
untamed natural condition of humanity or the default position of a society lacking a 
cohesive value set. The positive justification rests in the value of motivation, given that 
granting preferences goes with the grain of personal motivation and thus encourages 
both ‘deep’ and lifelong learning (Marton and Säljö, 1976). In terms of a modern cliché, 
if we want people to do their best, we should let them pursue their (not merely our) 
dreams, acknowledging that in such pursuit these dreams will modify, informed by the 
consequences of actions in the world. While ‘dreams’ may take longer to develop than 
simple preferences, it is clear that those who have not yet entered, let alone left, formal 
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adulthood are strongly motivated by personal aspirations This raises challenges in terms 
of how we consider childhood in relation to education, that will be addressed below. 
 
It should also be noted that aspirations need not be either rational or fully articulated 
verbally, but may often be evident in action and attitude. At the most basic level, 
preferences are realized in the processes and development of practices. Just as 
understanding can be construed as ‘know(ing) how to go on’  (Wittgenstein, 1967: 
S154) , preference can be construed as choosing how to go on; this happens inevitably 
and well before ratiocination. A child’s preferences can to a large extent be interpreted 
from the direction of their play and responses, articulated and emotional, while a 
teacher’s preferences are manifested as much in ‘where they take the lesson’ as in 
conscious utterance of opinions and biases. In effect, to allow feasible preferences in 
formal educational contexts is to allow situations to unfold in a manner that is not 
overly directed or constrained by the teacher, noting both the collective nature of 
classroom activity and the liberty rights of the teacher on the grounds of the argument 
here. Thus what is proposed is a sensitive negotiation, not a free-for-all. 
 
It is therefore important to clarify the parameters of preference utilitarianism in this 
study, as the remarks above take us a long way from certain established forms of 
utilitarianism. Certain versions of particularly contemporary utilitarianism, including 
that of Peter Singer, demand a strong universality
 
(Singer, 2011). On such a flat 
universal account, we should be as attentive to the preferences of a child on the other 
side of the world as to those of our own children. Notwithstanding the moral rigour of 
this position, the present argument accepts the inevitability of greater care and attention 
to those proximal than at great distance (XXX, 1998). This position is taken on 
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pragmatic grounds, for three reasons. First, as members of educational communities 
(teachers, say, or students), our moral choices are inevitably principally about what we 
do with, for and about ourselves and a small group of others within our organizations. 
Secondly, a flat universalism runs the risk of undermining the utilitarian impulse 
entirely. As Bernard Williams has argued, the challenge of the utilitarian calculus on the 
world stage is so great as to be self-defeating, and has little to offer moral concerns such 
as that of personal integrity (Smart and Williams, 1983). At the level of universality, the 
boundary between utilitarianism and deontology almost disappears. It could be argued 
that where actions should be calculated on the basis of what is best for the world as a 
whole, the position is almost akin to acting on the basis of a categorical imperative. (It 
is perhaps this difficulty that allows Barrow, below, to argue that Plato’s Republic is a 
utilitarian text.) Williams is thus right to critique utilitarianism in its most universalist 
forms, though not preference maximization per se that is not the focus of his argument. 
Individual preference satisfaction might, however, be offered as an alternative to 
Williams’ personal integrity. In the context of formal education, if every action were 
carefully considered using a universal felicific calculus, then a) hardly anything could 
get done, as each calculation would be so difficult, b) individual actors’ preferences 
would lose rather than gain salience, and therefore c) there would be no local advantage 
in adopting utilitarianism as an aspiration.  A final consideration is the glib but 
nevertheless logical observation that if everyone looked to the interests of those around 
them, the world would be a better place than one in which there was endless wrangling 
over universal goods. This argument therefore proceeds on three assumptions. First, we 
are each driven by an instinct to survive and flourish. Although the strength of this may 
vary from person to person and time to time, it does not require legal permission, 
though it does require some legal parameters for the protection of self and others. The 
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focus in this argument is on negative liberties
 
(Berlin, 1958); it follows Hobbes in 
arguing for partial social restraint on freedoms that are enjoyed regardless of formal 
assent. Secondly, we learn through managing risk and consequence. The argument for 
this has been made fully elsewhere (XXX, 2016a.). However, it is grounded in a general 
pragmatism: what something turns out to be is the sum total of its effects. As Peirce put 
it
 
(Peirce, 2011, first published 1878): 
‘Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object.’ (Retrieved from 
www.peirce.org/writings/p119.html 11 December 2015) 
As actors balancing personal and social identities, both risk taking and feedback on our 
actions are integral to our development. Rom Harré has referred to this as Publication in 
his ‘social reality matrix’ whereby personal and social identities are formed through a 
cycle of Conventionalisation, Appropriation, Publication and Transformation
 
(Harré, 
1983). Thirdly, we wish in general for others to survive and flourish, but not to the same 
extent as ourselves (until we are overcome by extreme weakness, fear or old age) and 
those closest to us. Related to this, we have a better understanding of the preferences of 
those closest to us than those further away. Thus this argument rejects flat universalism 
as well as undermining any strong philosophical tendency to assert that children need to 
know what flourishing is before being allowed to attempt to flourish on their own terms. 
The will to flourish is inherent, an aspect of the survival instinct, and we are all 
motivated to learn, through experience, what ‘flourishing’ means for us. Philosophers 
can be part of, but not determine, this developing understanding. 
 
A further piece of conceptual underlabouring is required with respect to the concept of 
childhood. The present argument can clearly not move forward on the basis that only 
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adults know what is good for children, yet acknowledgment of childhood as a category 
in any form implies recognition of children’s welfare and protection rights (Feinberg, 
1980). Children play at being adults – as do adults – but are considerably less 
accountable for their actions in certain respects. Any educational planning must 
acknowledge the tension between motivation and protection in all its dealings, but 
particularly those with children. 
 
This is not to argue that childhood is a fixed concept, but to acknowledge that its 
existence in any operational form implies a condition of less than full rational 
autonomy. There are several different influences on current conceptions of childhood: 
on one level, we are all children (so this conception is not even age-related); on another 
the young tend to be less competent than adult; on another, childhood’s innocence and 
vulnerability bring with them valuable insights and propensities (Wordsworth’s child 
‘as father of the man’: 1802, retrieved from www.bartleby.com/145/ww194.html 11 
December 2015). Nevertheless, all these views of the child imply beings who cannot be 
trusted with their own judgments to the extent that adults should be trusted as 
autonomous rational agents in modern post-Enlightenment societies, and who therefore 
require enhanced protection. On this ground, Feinberg stresses that liberty, or interest 
(we might say, preference) rights are principally adult rights, welfare rights are often 
common to adults and children, and children’s rights are often protection rights. In 
short, children tend to be passive recipients of their rights, while adults are active 
espousers of theirs.  
 
A problem with this view is that adults are not fully rational either. Indeed, either a 
‘fully rational’ or ‘fully irrational’ being is inconceivable, unless we take all universal 
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activity as rational, in which case children are as rational as adults. There is often 
hypocrisy in rationalist accounts insofar as assumptions of adult rationality may exclude 
large elements of the grown-up population, including foreigners, criminals, women and 
the mentally ill, let alone all non-human sentient beings. The idea that in a generally 
irrational universe, a small population of adult human beings ‘like us’ is rational is 
surely both indefensible and dangerous (See Stables, 2012, for a fuller development of 
this perspective). In any case, as all who have dealt with children are aware, children do 
have strong preferences. Indeed, while still legally children, young people in the teenage 
years are expected to make choices, such as what to do on leaving school, that will have 
lifelong consequences for them, including constraining to some degree their future 
actions as supposedly autonomous adults. Even very young children have strong 
preferences, albeit in contexts of extreme worldly inexperience. It is therefore surely 
part of the duty of educators to increase the capacity for, and scope of, preference 
fulfilment as children go through school. 
 
History of utilitarianism as an educational ideal 
Given its presence in political and ethical debate, it might be argued that utilitarianism 
receives surprisingly little explicit attention in philosophy of education. Utilitarian 
perspectives have, however, influenced educational debate from the outset. While many 
arguments for formal schooling were grounded in a felt need to discipline and otherwise 
constrain energetic youth (XXX, 2011, Ch. 3.1), Bentham’s Chrestomathia advocated a 
school in which emulation and competition would replace corporal punishment, visual 
aids including art and wall diagrams would stimulate and support learning, and children 
would be grouped according to ability (Itzkin, 1978). West states that J.S.Mill argued 
for ‘state supported education for all’ (West, undated, retrieved from 
 10 
www.utilitarianism.co./utilitarianism.html 11 December 2015.) While others argued for 
mass education for compliance and discipline, either religious or military, the early 
Utilitarians sought it, at least in part, as a means towards self-fulfilment. 
 
Paradoxically, the same impetus is evident in much of the deschooling literature, with 
its libertarian aspirations to escape the trammels of state-imposed content and teaching 
(e.g. Illich, 1995). Any argument questioning the level and extent of compulsion in 
schooling is underpinned by some desire to grant preferences
 
(XXX, 2014, 2016b.; 
Papastephanou, 2014), though more universalist forms of utilitarianism may serve to 
quash individuality, as satirised in Dickens’ portrayal of Gradgrind’s school of ‘facts’ in 
Hard Times (Dickens, 2003, first published 1854). 
 
One of the most extensive explicit defences of a utilitarian position in more recent 
literature is that of Barrow (1975). However, in arguing that Plato’s Republic is a 
utilitarian text insofar as it offers a template for the wellbeing of all citizens, Barrow 
may be stretching definitions of utilitarianism beyond their usual limits. Plato does not 
appear to place high value on either pleasure or, more broadly, personal preference, but 
is rather dismissive of all experience based knowledge claims. Such a critique has been 
expressed by Brenda Cohen (Cohen, 1977). In a later, less specifically educational 
work, Barrow develops his argument for a form of rule-utilitarianism on the grounds 
that such rule following tends to produce happiness more often than not (Barrow, 2015). 
Such forms of utilitarianism are miles apart from preference utilitarianism: so far, 
indeed, that a strongly rationalist commentator might be inclined to reject the present 
argument as anti-philosophical. To a Platonist it is indeed anti-philosophical, as it grants 
greater value in many situations to individual opinion than to supposedly objective 
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truth. However, such granting on the basis that it will promote stronger justification in 
the long term, as is argued below. 
 
A happiness based utilitarian account (of a more conventional sort than Barrow’s) is 
critiqued by Miles who has particular problem with the use of happiness as an aspiration 
for arts education
 
(Miles, 2006). The paper to which Miles is responding, by James 
Tarrant, raised different criticisms of utilitarianism, and is in effect a critique of J. S. 
Mill (Tarrant, 2006). Miles’s objection is along the lines that Tarrant’s rejection of 
utilitarianism does not address the root of the problem. Regarding Miles, there is surely 
a case to be answered here, insofar as no one chooses to sit through Shakespeare’s King 
Lear, say, in order for them to feel happier in the short term in any trivial sense. 
However, one may well have a preference to see King Lear, and preferences may be 
seen as instrumental in bringing extra happiness, in the broader sense of human 
flourishing, in the longer term. Watching King Lear can certainly enrich one’s 
experience. It is to avoid simple preconceptions around happiness that the present 
argument focuses on preferences. (It may almost go without saying that utilitarianism 
has been subject to a number of crude caricatures: as an obsession with facts and 
calculation in Dickens’ Hard Times, for example, the treatment of which in the novel is 
popularly characterised as a critique of utilitarianism
i
.)  
 
An argument for utilitarianism in relation to moral education by Hare has not attracted 
such criticism, perhaps in deference to Hare’s status as a moral philosopher (Hare, 1981, 
1992). Hare’s rejection of intuitionism and emphasis on rational debate about moral 
language appear at first blush to exert a considerable strain on any argument for 
granting the untutored wishes of young children. However, it is important to bear in 
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mind that Hare’s objections are at least in part to those who simply assume universalist 
moral positions without argument, such as Rawls in his theory of justice (Rawls, 2005, 
first published 1971).  Placing greater emphasis on justification of the grounds of belief 
rather than the mere fact of belief has the effect of bringing pleasure and preference 
satisfaction closer.  
 
‘Hare discusses, though in a different context (1981: 142–4), the pleasure machine 
imagined by J.J.C. Smart (Smart & Williams 1983: 18) that maximizes the pleasures of a 
subject through generating a stream of illusory but enjoyable experiences. He sees it as an 
advantage of his variety of utilitarianism that, not being “formulated in terms of 
pleasure”, it can give weight to whether “we prefer a life for ourselves plugged into the 
machines to one devoted to pursuits now considered normal and enjoyable”.’ (Price, 
2014).
 
 
 
The present argument is that maximal feasible preference granting (bearing in mind the 
strong protection and welfare rights enjoyed by children) is more rather than less likely 
to lead young people to value justified rather than merely intuited preferences, in part 
simply because they will have been engaged in debate about what preferences should, 
or can feasibly, be granted, and in part because they will have learnt from the 
consequences of enacting preferences from a young age. There is, of course, a necessary 
circularity about this position as all forms of pragmatist and consequentialist ethics 
assume that questions of feasibility cannot ultimately be separated from those of 
rational desirability. If it ends up working, it is right to want it. (It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to discuss how far Hare acknowledges this.) Although context suggests 
this was not the main intended force of the comment, Hare acknowledges that some sort 
of educative process must precede all sense of moral certainty: 
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‘The moral convictions to which (intuitionist) thinkers want us to appeal are themselves 
the product of moral education’ (Hare, 1992: 197), and 
 
‘What the children need to have learnt is how to think about such problems.’ (Hare, 1992: 
198) 
 
It is the contention of the present argument that we learn ‘how to think’ with reference 
to our (broadly understood) empirical experience, and that such experience is enriched 
by our following our interests and inclinations as much as is feasible. Of course, there 
are necessary disciplines which, in conjunction with the outcomes of our own choices, 
also make us think but imposed discipline without scope for initiative tends to restrict 
rather than develop thinking.  
 
This is not to assume that preferences are all of the same tendency. In Hare, 1981, for 
example, it is made clear that intensity of preference is a matter of concern, as are scope 
(including how any people are affected by the preference) and duration, and how we 
deal with preferences that are clearly illusory in some way. However, the fact that 
young children are likely to have naïve understandings of such concerns should not 
invalidate their finding out through the exercising of preferences given inevitable 
safeguards. The educational question is how best one learns ‘to think about such 
problems’. Unless a strong mind-body dualism is adopted, which would seem counter to 
most forms of consequentialism, trying things out and learning from what happens must 
surely play its part in developing moral reasoning as well as moral convictions. In short, 
it is only by exposing preferences that we can rationally discuss their ethical 
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implications, and such discussion can at least be informed by experience arising from 
preference granting. 
 
 
In summary, the extent to which utilitarianism is accepted as educationally valuable is 
determined in part by construal of its parameters. Nevertheless, it is clear that utilitarian 
impulses of somewhat varied characters have played their parts in moulding the 
contours of contemporary educational debate. Specifically, the recognition that personal 
interest plays more strongly into than runs against universal good has been a useful 
counter-balance to the view that children simply have to be socialised and have all their 
preferences systematically beaten out of them: a counter-view to preference 
utilitarianism that not only underpins certain of the original arguments for compulsory 
education (XXX,2011, Ch.3.1)
 
 but also was sufficiently widely held to infuse the 
English literary tradition, as, for example, in the horrific account of Lowood School in 
Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre. (Brontë, 1992). 
 
The parameters of maximal preference utilitarianism for schoolchildren 
Taking all the above into account, it is appropriate to suggest a local and specific 
preferential calculus for the context of schools and other forms of educational encounter 
with children. This is termed preferential rather than felicific since we are following 
Bentham broadly but focusing on preference rather than happiness. It can be modified 
as a useful heuristic for course planning and tutoring in further, higher and adult 
education, as is discussed in the final section.  
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A problem with the application of classical Utilitarianism to the teaching of children is 
that, on Bentham’s calculation, the happiness/pleasure principle is likely to trump 
children’s preference on the grounds that teachers know better than children what is 
likely to produce extended pleasure. Bentham’s calculus has seven elements: Intensity 
(the intensity of the proposed pleasure); Duration (how long the effect will last); 
Certainty (the likelihood of the pleasure resulting from the action); Propinquity (the 
time taken until the effect); Fecundity (the likelihood of repetition); Purity (the absence 
of negative side-effects), and Extent (the number of people affected). While children 
will have experience sufficient for them to judge well on the Intensity criterion, their 
inexperience is likely to affect their judgment on all the other criteria. At first blush, 
therefore, it would seem that the best way to ensure children’s experiences is to deny 
them preferences. However, with the exception of the world’s Gradgrinds, it is 
generally accepted in liberal democratic societies that personal preference is central to 
the pursuit of happiness. The challenge is to create a formulation that considers issues of 
Duration, Certainty, Propinquity, Fecundity, Purity and Extent while still giving priority 
to children’s albeit naïve preferences. 
 
Based on each of the above considerations, therefore, the following is suggested. The 
question for educators is: 
 
How do I link [my understanding of] this child’s wishes to [my understanding 
of] the situation and the consequences of granting such wishes [bearing in mind 
Intention, Duration, Certainty, Propinquity, Fecundity, Purity and Extent], such 
that the child’s wishes can be granted as far as is feasible without detriment to 
the child’s welfare? 
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(That is to say, such wish-granting must turn out to be at least welfare-neutral.) 
 
The two key principles here are: 1. the child’s wishes; 2. the calculation of their 
consequences and feasibility (for the school context itself severely limits the possible 
range of actions); 3. How to grant (1) as fully as possible in the light of (2). 
 
Suppose, for example, that a child who requires less classroom time than most to 
achieve highly on the formal curriculum has the opportunity to visit a space centre for 
the day and much wants to. Current law forbids her being taken out of school. This 
calculus would likely permit it. The same might be true for a child who is failing to 
progress in certain classroom activities but has the opportunity to attend a sports 
training camp during term time to progress in an activity towards which he is strongly 
motivated. While the proposed model falls far short of an anarchistic free-for-all, it is, 
for all its hedges and safeguards, likely to prove vastly more permissive than current 
policies in England and similarly orientated polities. 
 
In the everyday life of the classroom, it is pertinent to return to the earlier claim that 
preferences are realized in the processes and development of practices. Here, the 
implications of the proposed model will seem radical to those who oppose all forms of 
incorrectness, randomness and open-ended experiment. To allow feasible preference in 
many situations might be to allow children to work with a conceptualization that will 
ultimately be falsified. A minor but telling example comes from Kambouri’s study of 
early childhood practices, in which children maintained that water is white (Kambouri, 
2015). An important educational question concerns whether teachers should simply 
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reject this assertion as wrong (as all expert opinion holds it to be) or encourage children 
to work with it to find out for themselves, and on their own terms, where the 
conceptualization is lacking. On the present account, the latter approach offers a 
possibility for deep learning that the former denies. 
 
It should be stressed, however, that at no point has it been suggested that teaching is 
merely a matter of attempting to grant preference. It has been argued that preferences 
should be granted where feasible within the contexts of in loco parentis relationships 
and inevitable, but not unnecessarily extensive, institutional, organizational and 
curricular constraints. The scope for action in schools is necessarily circumscribed; the 
emphasis here is to allow for a much freedom of action as possible with minimal, rather 
than minimum, circumscription. Constraints entail protection and it has been 
acknowledged that children, by definition, are entitled to forms of protection, though it 
has not been the concern of this paper to explore these in detail. Education’s processes 
can, will and should involve challenging habits and perceptions: learning and living 
more broadly always carry an element of disillusionment as past assumptions are 
challenged and disrupted. Adults tend to recognise more than children that chronic 
sweet eating rots one’s teeth, and any calculus relating to children inevitably involves 
assessment of longer term pleasures and pains that inexperienced children may be less 
placed to make than experienced adults. To acknowledge this, however, is not to 
sanction constant overriding of children’s immediate preferences on the grounds that 
they do not know what is best for them; ultimately, they must find this out for 
themselves as they live lives inevitably different, and differently contextualized, from 
ours.  
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An interesting parallel to the children-and-sweets issue is that of adults-and-wine. Most 
adults recognize that anything more than limited alcohol intake is likely to be bad for 
them, but many continue with it. However, there is empirical evidence to show that 
controlled experimentation can procduce significant insights. The first example relates 
to what one pays for alcohol as opposed to the immediate health issue but is 
nevertheless relevant. There have been numerous blind tastings of wine that have 
surprised participants by revealing to them that they cannot, in fact, differentiate 
between cheap and expensive wines on the grounds of taste (Guardian, 2015). The 
second is both personal and widespread. The present author is aware of more than one 
individual who modified his or her drinking habits significantly as a result of reading 
about a study that described the health benefits to middle-aged moderate drinkers of 
giving up alcohol completely for a month (Daily Mail, 2015). Allowing choice and then 
being encouraged to reflect on it in a systematic way can have a much stronger 
educational effect than letting habits, good or bad, go unchecked. As far as is feasible 
and broadly safe, learning through experience has more powerful effects than merely 
listening and memorizing, and some vital experiences (such as watching King Lear, or 
some equivalently challenging play or film preferred by a child) can be had without any 
immediate danger to life and limb; in other cases, limited risk taking that involves small 
but real physical risk may be educationally valuable, as acknowledged by both Locke 
and Rousseau, for example (Locke, 1692; Rousseau and Bloom, 2001). If the aim of 
education is in part to produce responsible citizens, it is hard to see how this can be 
done without allowing children to take some responsibility and to learn from the 
consequences of so doing.  
 
Application beyond children 
 19 
This final section considers how far the local calculus above for the following two 
groups: adult students in voluntary (further or higher) education, and teachers at all 
system levels. 
 
Students in further and higher education of legal adult age have voluntarily entered into 
a contract to undertake a course. Should this not conform to their wishes, they can 
leave. If there are issues of funding that render this problematic, these could be 
addressed, but it must be assumed in general that teachers/lecturers are largely granting 
the students’ preferences, and the students, as adults, are free to request modifications to 
the course should this be felt not to be the case in certain respects. On these grounds, the 
responsibility of teachers towards adult students is significantly different from that 
towards children. 
 
This is not to deny the common triadic framework between all teaching situations: that 
of teacher-student-subject. Higher education teachers, like those in schools, are 
inducting students into disciplinary practices. The difference lies with the older student 
having entered into the contract to undertake this work voluntarily. The terms of 
engagement should therefore be broadly analogous with those relating to entry into all 
forms of contract: the student should know roughly what type and level of service to 
expect and should have appropriate forms of complaint and redress available as 
appopriate. This contrasts with the child who cannot be presumed to know roughly what 
to expect as s/he is not, in legal terms anyway, regarded as an autonomous rational 
agent. This means that in further and higher education the terms of the contract are of 
utmost importance, as are the known consequences for significantly departing from it. 
The contract can determine, in broad but agreed terms, the level of student preference 
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and choice that will operate. This is a very different situation from that applying to a 
formal school. 
 
Teachers themselves should be considered with respect to this model also. To an extent, 
the relationship of teacher to employer is synonymous with that of child to 
schoolteacher: that is, the employer has responsibility for the wellbeing of the teacher 
but also inevitably constrains her actions to a considerable degree. However, having 
appointed a teacher on the understanding that he can exercise his professional judgment 
flexibly with respect to the children he teaches, due regard should also be paid to the 
teacher’s own requests for professional and personal development. As with children, 
there are advantages to be gained from going with the grain of teachers’ motivations by 
allowing their preferences (within the boundaries of their employment of teaching only) 
as far as is feasible without detriment to others. 
 
Concluding remarks 
I have argued that students’ preferences, including those of very young children, should 
play their part in determining and modifying educational provision, allowing teaching, 
as far as is possible, to go with the grain of learner motivation. This has particular 
implications for schools (as opposed to institutions of further and higher institution) 
which are premised on the assumption that children do not know what is best for them, 
so have very restricted liberty rights, though they enjoy strong welfare and protection 
rights. A preferential calculus for use by teachers in schools is suggested, and there is 
discussion about how far such a calculus should be relevant to adult students, or indeed 
to teachers themselves. It is hoped that this may contribute to further discussion about 
the still relatively neglected issue of the degree to which educational aims should 
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incorporate compulsion on the one hand and, on the other, attempt to respond to 
individual preferences.   
 22 
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Notes 
                                                 
i
 See, for example, the quite misleading definition of Utilitarianism as a philosophy that takes no 
heed of individual interests in <www.charlesdickensinfo.com/novels/hard-times/> (accessed 18 
November, 2015) 
